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REVOLUTIONARIEs, BARBARIANs OR WAR 
MACHINEs?
GANGs IN NICARAGUA AND sOUTH AFRICA
STEFFEN JENSEN AND DENNIS RODGERS
Images of urban gangs as the embodiment of a modern-day barbarism are commonplace, particularly in policy-making circles,1 among law 
enforcement officials,2 as well as large swathes of the general population.3 
More often than not fuelled and underpinned by the sensationalist media 
depictions of the phenomenon,4 such portraits tend to represent gangsters 
either as evil and deranged sociopaths,5 or as the exemplification of the ever-
growing spread of anomic and senseless violence in a world that is increasingly 
characterised by the loss of traditional socio-political reference points.6 In his 
classic anti-colonial manifesto The Wretched of the Earth Franz Fanon famously 
proposed an alternative vision, however. Although he acknowledged that the 
gangster was often ‘a thief, a scoundrel or a reprobate’, he also contended 
that when the gangster’s violence was directed against colonial authority, it 
became imbued with popular legitimacy through a process of ‘automatic’ 
identification, and the gangster as a result ‘lights the way for the people’.7
The post-colonial transition notwithstanding, this view of gangs as proto-
revolutionary vanguards has continued to inform the analyses of many gang 
researchers over the past few decades.8 During the course of our own research 
on gangs in respectively a poor neighbourhood in Managua, the capital city 
of Nicaragua, and a coloured township in Cape Town, South Africa, we 
have found considerable empirical resonance between Fanon’s vision and 
the real-life discourses of many of the gangsters that we have interviewed 
and spent time with. Although narratives of fighting with the authorities, 
only stealing from the rich (or the racially dominant), and protecting local 
communities and neighbourhoods have long been features uncovered by 
research on gangs,9 we found these to often be actively framed in explicitly 
revolutionary terms. Nicaraguan gang members, for example, frequently 
compared their behaviour with the actions of the Sandinista revolutionary 
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regime, while gangs in post-Apartheid South Africa explicitly justified 
themselves as ANC-inspired forms of resistance against institutionalised 
racism.
Such clear-cut discourses by the principal actors involved seemingly make 
the idea that contemporary urban gangs are proto-revolutionary vanguard 
social forms highly appealing, but a more fine-grained analysis suggests that 
the reality is much more complex. Although drug gangs in Cape Town 
in the late 1990s, for example, often undoubtedly constituted important 
economic resources for township inhabitants – as one beneficiary put it, 
‘in the townships there are no banks, only the merchant [drug dealer]’ – 
their territorial occupation of townships was premised on a violence which, 
despite their own representations, was often turned against local inhabitants. 
Similarly, while many living in Managua’s myriad poor neighbourhoods 
during the 1990s considered that their local gang ‘protects us and allows us 
to feel a little bit safer, to live our lives a little bit more easily’, in the 2000s 
the same people simultaneously saw gangs as precipitating a ‘state of siege’ 
which made it ‘impossible to live’. In the face of such ambiguity, the notion 
of gangs as revolutionaries – no less than barbaric sociopaths – misses the 
point. 
Instead, we wish to propose that gangs are a phenomenon better viewed 
through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the ‘war machine’.10 This captures 
not only the ambiguities of gangs, but also the underlying similarities between 
gangs that have emerged in very different contexts, each with their own 
localised histories of accumulation and marginalisation. In doing so it allows 
us to better understand what it is that gangs and their violent practices really 
represent, and what relation they have, if any, to revolution.
GANGS AND REVOLUTION: MANAGUA
There exists a direct relationship between the contemporary rise of Nicaraguan 
youth gangs and revolution. Although the phenomenon has roots that can be 
traced back to the 1940s, it only emerged as a significant social factor in the 
early 1990s, following the demobilisation of thousands of young men from 
the ranks of the Sandinista Popular Army (the age of military conscription 
was sixteen).11 Gang members from this period systematically mentioned 
three basic reasons for joining a gang. First, the change of regime in 1990 led 
to an abrupt devaluation of their social status, which as conscripts defending 
‘the Nation’, had previously been very high; becoming gang members 
had seemed a means of reaffirming themselves vis-à-vis a wider society 
that seemed to rapidly forget them. Second, becoming gang members had 
been a way of recapturing some of the dramatic, yet formative and almost 
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addictive, adrenaline-charged experiences of war, danger and death, as well 
as of comradeship and solidarity which they had lived through as conscripts, 
and which were rapidly becoming scarce commodities in polarised post-war 
Nicaragua. But third, and perhaps most important from the point of view 
of the link with revolution, becoming gang members had seemed to many 
a natural continuation of their previous role as conscripts. The early 1990s 
were highly uncertain times, marked by political polarisation, violence, and 
spiralling insecurity, and these youths felt they could better ‘serve’ their 
families and friends by joining a gang than attempting to ‘protect’ them as 
individuals.
By the mid-1990s, however, what could perhaps be characterised as an 
incipient form of vigilantism had become institutionalised via a process of 
local territorialisation based on forms of gang warfare that through their 
semi-ritualised nature provided a sense of predictability for local inhabitants 
within a wider context of chronic insecurity. The first battle of a gang war 
typically involved fighting with fists and stones, but each new battle involved 
an escalation of weaponry, first to sticks, then to knives and broken bottles, 
and eventually to guns, mortars and AK-47s. Although the rate of escalation 
varied, its sequence never did – i.e. gangs never began their wars with firearms. 
The fixed nature of gang warfare constituted something of a mechanism for 
restraining violence, insofar as escalation is a process in which each stage 
calls for a greater but definite intensity of action, and is therefore always 
under the actors’ control. It also provided local neighbourhood inhabitants 
with an ‘early warning system’, such that gang wars can be conceived as 
having been ‘scripted performances’ that offered local communities a means 
of circumscribing what Hannah Arendt famously termed the ‘all-pervading 
unpredictability’ of violence.12 The motivation offered by gang members for 
this particular behaviour pattern was imbued with a definite political ideology: 
they repeatedly claimed to be ‘the last inheritors of Sandinismo’, contending 
that they had joined the gang and engaged in violence due to their ‘love’ 
(‘querer’) for their local neighbourhood. One gang member called Miguel 
claimed: ‘Así somos, nosotros los bróderes pandilleros [that’s how we are, us gang 
member brothers], we show our love for the neighbourhood by fighting 
other gangs’; another called Julio said that ‘you show the neighbourhood 
that you love it by putting yourself in danger for people, by protecting them 
from other gangs... You look after the neighbourhood in that way, you help 
them, keep them safe’.
A conceptual parallel can be made here with the ‘love’ that Ernesto (Che) 
Guevara saw as the mark of ‘the true revolutionary’.13 Guevara, however, 
was referring to an abstract ‘love of the people’, while gang members were 
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clearly motivated by a much more narrow, localised form of affection. This 
was expressed very clearly by the gang member called Julio, as he cleaned 
up a local graffiti extolling the virtues of the Sandinista youth organisation, 
which a person or persons unknown had crudely painted over in bright red – 
the colours of the anti-Sandinista PLC (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista) – the 
night before. Julio angrily berated the ‘hijos de la setenta mil putas Somocistas’ 
(‘sons of seventy thousands Somocista whores’) who had done this: 
Those jodidos [assholes] don’t respect anything in the neighbourhood, 
Dennis, nothing! OK, so they don’t like Sandinismo, that’s how it 
is, I don’t like their politics either, but this is more than just a 
Sandinista pinta [graffiti], it’s a part of the neighbourhood history. 
Our history, bróder! It’s something that belongs to the community, 
to all of us; it shows us who we are, where we come from, how 
Sandinismo built our houses and made us into a community. It 
shows what the neighbourhood is, and people should therefore 
respect it, whatever their political opinions.
To this extent, Julio’s revolutionary sympathies can be said to have 
reflected less a revolutionary ideology than his local neighbourhood’s 
historical associations with Sandinismo (it had been a hotbed of anti-Somoza 
activity during the insurrection, as well as the pilot neighbourhood for the 
new revolutionary government’s urban reconstruction programme in the 
early 1980s).14 Certainly, there also existed a revealing discrepancy between 
gang members’ political rhetoric and the concrete reality of their political 
practices. Although Julio and other gang members for example all actively 
volunteered to help with Daniel Ortega’s campaign for the October 1996 
elections, putting up banners and distributing flyers in their neighbourhood, 
for example, this support remained exclusively local in scope. None of the 
gang members volunteered to help outside the neighbourhood, even when 
Ortega’s campaign tour stopped at the nearby market, where they often 
spent much of their time. Nor did any of the gang members make any efforts 
to go to the Sandinista party’s campaign closing rally in downtown Managua, 
despite it being widely publicised, with free buses laid on to boost attendance. 
Ultimately, the parallels between gang activities and revolutionary action in 
Nicaragua in the 1990s proved largely circumstantial, as was highlighted 
dramatically when gang dynamics changed radically between the mid-1990s 
and the early 2000s. In particular, gangs evolved from being motivated by 
a sense of social solidarity with their local community to being predatory 
institutions focused on regulating an emergent cocaine-based drug economy, 
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to the exclusive benefit of their members who dominated the drug-dealing 
‘labour market’, so to speak.
Although drugs were by no means unknown to gang members such as 
Julio or Miguel in the mid-1990s, their main drug of choice at the time 
had been marijuana and they had not been involved in any regular form of 
trafficking. Cocaine dealing developed in the neighbourhood from mid-1999 
onwards; initially on a small scale involving just one individual but rapidly 
expanding into a three-tiered pyramidal drug economy which by mid-2000 
solely involved gang members and ex-gang members.15 The potential rewards 
of the drugs trade were substantial at all levels of its pyramidal economy, 
ranging from around $450 per month at the lowest street-selling level to 
upwards of $1,100 per month for the middle level, and clearly much more 
for the top tier (about which precise information was less easy to obtain). In 
a neighbourhood where about half of the economically active population 
was unemployed, and a further 25 per cent underemployed, and where in 
2002-03 those who did work earned a median monthly income of about 
$105, such sums were extremely significant. A gang member called Kalia 
made this clear during an interview in February 2002: ‘What the fuck do 
you do when you don’t have any food and there’s no work to be had? You 
have to find some other way to look out for yourself, that’s what! That’s 
where selling drugs comes in, they’re the only thing that’s worthwhile doing 
here in the neighbourhood’.
Overall some 40 per cent of households in Kalia’s neighbourhood seemed 
to be benefiting either directly or indirectly from drug trafficking. Most 
obviously, many of the previously ramshackle, mainly wooden, washed-out, 
monochrome houses had undergone a very visible process of infrastructural 
amelioration, with a significant proportion now bigger, (re)built in brick 
and concrete, often painted in bright pastel colours, and in some cases even 
two stories high (a rarity in earthquake-prone Managua). The changes inside 
many of these houses were just as impressive and extensive, as they now 
displayed tiled instead of dirt floors, fitted kitchens instead of gas burners, 
and (local) designer furniture instead of second-hand, as well as luxurious 
appliances such as wide-screen televisions with cable services, mega-
wattage sound systems, Nintendo game consoles, and in one exceptional 
case a broadband-connected computer. The inhabitants of these new houses 
generally wore better-quality – often brand-name – clothes than had been 
the norm previously, displayed ostentatious jewellery and expensive watches, 
had the latest model mobile phones (in a neighbourhood where only a dozen 
households had had land lines) and ate imported food which they often 
bought in supermarkets rather than the local open-air market.
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At the same time, however, the local neighbourhood drug economy 
was violently regulated by gang members who frequently brutalised local 
inhabitants in order to precipitate a generalised state of terror and ensure 
that their dealing could occur unimpeded. As one woman lamented during 
an interview in February 2002, specifically contrasting the situation with the 
mid-1990s, when the neighbourhood gang had an ethos of social solidarity:
Before, you could trust the gang, but not anymore… They’ve 
become corrupted due to this drug crack… They threaten, attack 
people from the neighbourhood now, rob them of whatever they 
have, whoever they are… They never did that before… They 
used to protect us, look out for us, but now they don’t care, they 
only look out for themselves, for their illegal business… People 
are scared, you’ve got to be careful what you say or what you do, 
because otherwise they’ll attack you… We live in terror here, you 
have to be scared or else you’re sure to be sorry…
Despite this clearly very different relationship with the local community, 
gang members nevertheless frequently continued to invoke the 
neighbourhood’s historical association with Sandinismo in order to justify 
their actions. Indeed during an interview in February 2002, Bismarck, an 
ex-gang member turned middle-level dealer, directly compared the drug 
trafficking to the neighbourhood reconstruction programme promoted by 
the revolutionary government of the 1980s. Sitting in his plush new home 
built with drug money, he asked: 
‘So, Dennis, how do you see the barrio now? It’s been what, 
almost 5 years since you were last here? Things have changed, 
haven’t they? What do you think of my house, do you remember 
how it used to be a wood shack with cardboard instead of window 
panes?’
 ‘Yes, I mean, wow, it’s absolutely incredible how it’s changed, 
Bismarck! All this concrete, these brick, these tiles, and this 
electronic equipment… It’s all because of drugs?’
‘That’s right! You wouldn’t believe how much money you can 
make selling that shit!’
‘Well, it’s certainly impressive, I have to admit. I never thought 
I’d see anything like this, last time the barrio seemed to be 
completely regressing…’
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‘So it was, but now it’s been rebuilt like after the Revolution, 
except that instead of Sandinismo, it’s the market that’s been helping 
us!’
‘I guess you could put it that way, Bismarck, but don’t you think 
there’s also a big difference between Sandinismo and the market? I 
mean, the drugs aren’t helping everybody, are they? Sure, there are 
lots of nice, new houses in the barrio now, but some of these new 
houses are better than others. Yours is much nicer than Kalia’s 
next door, for example, although he also sells drugs, and there are 
also many houses in the barrio that haven’t changed at all since I 
was last here. There’s lots of inequality now, which wasn’t the case 
before, and that can’t be a good thing’.
‘Well, you can’t help everybody, you know. Life is hard here in 
Nicaragua, Dennis, and you’ve got be clever and try to survive by 
hook or by crook. Kalia’s just plain dumb, he uses his profits from 
selling drugs to smoke up, and then loses his head and can’t sell 
properly. And those who don’t have the drugs to sell, well, that’s 
just the luck of the draw. It’s like the lottery that attributed the 
houses in the rebuilt barrio to everybody, some people got bigger 
and better located houses than others, but nobody complained 
because it was all random, and everybody had the same chances to 
start off with’.
Of course, not everybody had the same opportunities, insofar as drug 
dealers were all gang members or ex-gang members, whose monopoly 
over the use of violence in the neighbourhood was what enabled them to 
sustain and regulate drug dealing. Instead of promoting a sense of inclusion 
and universal protection, gangs in urban Nicaragua in 2002-03 could now 
more plausibly be seen as engaged in localised ‘primitive accumulation’. 
Gang members violently constituted themselves as a nascent local ‘narco-
bourgeoisie’ in a context of otherwise extreme poverty and acutely limited 
alternative economic opportunities. By 2007, the situation was even starker, 
as the gang had become professionalised and drew members from a variety 
of neighbourhoods. To this extent, even if members of contemporary 
Nicaraguan gangs still compare their behaviour to the actions of the Sandinista 
revolutionary regime, they now effectively embody an ideology that clearly 
mirrors Nicaragua’s broader post-revolutionary political economy of ever-
increasing levels of inequality and iniquitous governance.16
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GANGS AND REVOLUTION: CAPE TOWN
As in Nicaragua, there are obvious links between gang culture and revolution 
in South Africa, i.e. the ANC-led struggle against the notorious apartheid 
regime, known simply as ‘the struggle’. This is especially the case among 
African17 gangs in and around Johannesburg, where African urban male 
subcultures developed along ethnic lines as a general consequence of the 
expansion of the mining sector in the 1930s and 1940s.18 While initially 
similar to other urban gangs that have developed in contexts of rapid 
urbanisation and social change around the world,19 these groups became 
increasingly directed against dominant white society following the social 
devastation produced by the forced resettlement of Johannesburg’s African 
population to townships in the 1950s. Resettlement set the scene for the 
gangs’ militarisation and their embracing the struggle following the Soweto 
uprising of 1976, which constituted a turning point in the fight against 
apartheid.20 From this moment on gang subculture became subsumed 
within the larger framework of the struggle.21 A clear indication of their 
new revolutionary ethos was the fact that the gangs which had developed in 
Soweto township after the forced removals in the 1950s changed their name 
from ‘tsotsi’ (hooligan or thug) to ‘comtsotsi’ (a combination of ‘comrade’ and 
‘tsotsi’).
A similar link between gangs and revolution also existed in Cape Town, 
where gangs in coloured townships were instrumental in the widespread 
consumer boycotts called by the ANC against the apartheid regime. For 
example, a local township activist called Gadidja described how she had 
enticed the gangs to participate in the boycotts: ‘I’d tell Dessie, the leader of 
the gang, do you know that the white man’s trucks are coming in through 
Modderdam Road? And Dessie would go to the road and order the trucks 
looted’. Another activist, however, suggested that ‘the gangs actually 
exploited the struggle. It gave them freedom to commit crimes; they would 
exploit it and hijack the meat truck, the furniture truck, anything. At the 
time, it was acceptable because it was a part of causing havoc amongst the 
whites. […] We saw this as being part of the campaign, but not realizing that 
these guys were actually exploiting the whole situation’.
Certain ex-gangsters interviewed some 13 years after the end of the 
struggle would often comment on the involvement of gangs with some 
amusement: ‘Yeah, those were glorious days. But you know, we were 
actually protecting the community’. This claim is by no means implausible. 
As a former township activist said regarding the looting of trucks, ‘then there 
was chicken for everyone’. There existed a definite sense in which gangsters 
adopted something of a ‘social bandit’ role,22 re-distributing some of the 
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gains from their criminal proceedings, which helped make them a symbol 
of the struggle for many in the townships. Gangsters furthermore patrolled 
and policed the boundary between the townships and dominant society, 
contributing to the former’s reputation for being ‘ungovernable’, which 
arguably minimised the apartheid state’s everyday intervention.
To this extent, coloured gangs in Cape Town can be said to have been 
active in the struggle, but their commitment as well as their genesis varied 
markedly from that of Johannesburg gangs. This is partly because Cape Town 
gangs did not emerge as a response to migration to the mines, but were 
rather a product of the waves of coloureds and poor whites who migrated to 
the city as a result of the South African rural crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. 
These migrants – often referred to as ‘plaas-jappies’ or ‘country bumpkins’ 
– moved to Cape Town’s traditional working class districts, where they 
encountered an old and established multicultural urban society.23 As these 
districts changed – becoming poorer, increasingly coloured, and more 
conflict-ridden – gang cultures developed. Ironically, the first gangs emerged 
as a vigilante response to rising crime levels, as an attempt to control the 
menace of the ‘skollie’, or thug.24 Economic need and increasing repression 
by the police, however, rapidly led to gang members developing more 
classic criminal entrepreneurial activities.25 But from the 1960s onwards the 
apartheid regime began to forcibly remove people from the old working 
class neighbourhoods in the centre of Cape Town to council housing on 
the Cape Flats, some fifteen kilometres from the city centre. This caused 
significant disruptions to all local social activity, including that of the gangs, 
which were scattered across the vast expanse of the new townships, and it 
took a full decade for gangs to re-emerge as a significant Capetonian social 
feature, albeit now in a distinct Cape Flats version.26
Having lived through forced removals and being brought up on tales of 
injustices, these new gangs were particularly hostile towards dominant white 
society. Although the coloured townships can in general be said to have 
had a precarious and strained relationship with the struggle, and especially 
with African ‘comrades’ who often themselves did not trust coloured 
activists either, gangsters rapidly became involved in the struggle along very 
similar lines to gangs in Johannesburg. Indeed, many of the gangsters talked 
continuously of their activism against the whites and the Apartheid regime, 
often explicitly identifying themselves as having been part of a ‘vanguard’. 
This zeal and antagonism towards the dominant white society was not 
confined to the struggle years, however. In 1999, one drug-dealing gangster 
called Mattie claimed: ‘Actually this [the drug-dealing] is all because of the 
whites, die vokkers. We still fight them. We fight die boere [the police] and we 
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only go steal in white areas. And you know, we really suffered. They beat 
us and put us in jail’. 
Such a view of gangsterism was echoed more generally among the wider 
township population. When the largest drug dealer in Mattie’s township, 
Kelly, was killed by unknown assassins in March 1998, the community was 
abuzz with stories of his bravery vis-à-vis the white police.27 Furthermore, 
Kelly was explicitly portrayed as having tried to live up to the model of the 
‘social bandit’. He was rumoured to have donated money to old age homes, 
lent to the cash-strapped, and regularly disciplined those who transgressed 
the norms of acceptable behaviour in the township. Kelly was by no means 
the only gangster to engage in such forms of social solidarity; Daniel Reed 
has described how Cape Town township gangs were often founded with 
the explicit intention of defending their local communities.28 Furthermore, 
in the post-apartheid era, there exists a widespread notion among African 
and coloured gang members that they must protect their territory, referred 
to as ‘die agterbuurde’, or the back streets, in opposition to white society.29 
Indeed, there can often be an almost symbiotic relationship between gangs 
and the local community. In her study of gender in a coloured Cape Town 
township, Elaine Salo shows how young men in gangs formed a strategic 
alliance with women in the community.30 The women, often the mothers 
of the young men, would exonerate their gang-related practices in return for 
their respect for the women and defence of territory. An important element 
allowing for the legitimisation of such alliances was the past association of 
gang violence with the struggle.
But nowhere within the Cape Flats world of gangsters are revolutionary 
associations more prominent than in prison. South African prisons are very 
violent and are dominated by organised gang structures, referred to as the 
number gangs – 26, 27 and 28.31 Although these gangs originated in and 
around Cape Town, they are now national in scope. Despite the fact that 
coloureds only account for 9 per cent of the total South African population, 
these dominate both the prison and the gangs, partly because for almost a 
century they have been vastly over-represented in jail – relative to population 
size, in 1993 there were four times as many coloureds in jail as Africans – and 
they stay longer, often because they commit gang-related crimes in prison 
that lead to an extension of their imprisonment. The gangs relate quite clearly 
to notions of masculinity, insofar as to be a member of one of these gangs 
is to be an ‘ndota’ [‘man’ in iziZulu]. Inmates become ndotas through an 
initiatory ritual process of stabbing a warder and subsequently submitting to 
the consequent violent punishment and solitary confinement. In the process 
the incumbent has to exhibit solidarity (he must do it for the advancement of 
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the gang), stoicism (he must not show pain) and measured restraint (he must 
not mortally wound the warder). In this way, the prison gangs ‘transform… 
the [institutional prison] violence from a tool of mortification into a form of 
nourishment’ of masculine assertion.32
At the same time, however, such practices clearly also lend themselves 
to an understanding of gangs as being in a constant state of struggle against 
whites and dominant society, and fuel a narrative of antagonism and resistance 
to the state in which ndotas pay the highest price as a revolutionary vanguard. 
In contradiction to this narrative, however, stand gang-related practices both 
in prison and in the townships. While gangs, in and out of prison, represent 
themselves in a revolutionary manner, they are in fact arguably reproducing 
the very oppression, physical as well as discursive, against which they purport 
to act. 
First of all, when we move from the level of narrative to practice, we 
realise that many of the elements of gang narratives break down: they do 
steal from their own; they maim and kill (sometimes incidentally) fellow 
township residents; they sell drugs and engage in numerous illicit economic 
activities that have toxic social consequences; and they fight each other, 
often with dramatic consequences for local communities. Gang members 
– and other youth as well – often engage in these practices for reasons of 
individual or group survival: there are few employment opportunities in the 
context of a wider South African economy that is characterised by highly 
segmented and constrained labour markets. 
Secondly, while group membership may be seen as imperative for 
personal survival, as the police increasingly target young coloured men 
in arbitrary ways, the existence of gangs has facilitated – or necessitated, 
depending on one’s point of view – a constant security presence of the state 
in the townships. To this extent, while the gangs claim to protect their 
local communities, their presence and practices are what allows for further 
oppression. Gang membership has also become the reason for the continued 
stereotyping of the coloured townships on the Cape Flats. 
Finally, gangs as social structures are also inherently conservative. Rather 
than challenging the over-arching (capitalist and racial) structures of prison 
and society, they reproduce the system, which does allow for their continued 
existence and (male) dominance. Both township and prison have been turned 
into domains that are run by ndotas and where, as the saying goes in Cape 
Town, ‘the rest are made women out of’. To paraphrase Philippe Bourgois, 
the gangs reproduce patriarchy on the streets.33 If this is revolution, then the 
gangs themselves appear to be its sole beneficiaries.
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GANGS AS WAR MACHINES
Although gang members in Nicaragua and South Africa often explicitly 
seek to justify their social practices by associating them discursively with 
revolution, such invocations in many ways constitute little more than 
attempts to mitigate the stigma of barbarism that is so often levelled at gangs 
and their violence. While gangs often do draw some level of support from 
the local neighbourhood communities within which they emerge (not least 
as sons, neighbours or friends), arguably all this does is ‘blur’ violent gang 
practices. In the final analysis, gangs in both Managua and Cape Town 
are really not fighting ‘for’ anything but themselves. Although they can 
plausibly be said to be fighting ‘against’ wider structural circumstances of 
economic exclusion and racism, most of the time the behaviour patterns of 
gang members are clearly motivated principally by their own interests rather 
than the active promotion of any form of collective good. To this extent, 
their association with revolution must be seen principally as part of a sub-
cultural repertoire – which also includes particular narratives and practices 
of gang warfare, initiations, and bodily performances34 – that allows gangs 
to articulate themselves as concrete institutional forms within particular 
historical contexts of economic and political hardship and flux. 
For this reason, we suggest that gangs are better conceived through the 
notion of the ‘war machine’ rather than as vanguard revolutionary violence or 
modern-day forms of barbarism. Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this notion 
to discuss social phenomena that direct their actions against domination, 
but without necessarily having well-defined battle lines or standard forms 
of confrontation.35 A ‘war machine’ does not display political consciousness; 
it is not directed towards establishing an alternative form of authority; it 
simply destabilises (in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, it ‘deterritorialises’) 
authority. Such a characterisation of the ‘war machine’ is in many ways 
reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s famous ‘destructive character’, who is 
‘always blithely at work’, just ‘clearing away’ and ‘reduc[ing] to rubble’. This 
is particularly apt in relation to gangs considering that Benjamin contended 
that ‘the destructive character is young and cheerful’.36 Yet viewing gangs 
as ‘war machines’ does potentially open up somewhat more ‘utopian’ 
associations than the impoverished options of Benjamin’s ‘destructive 
character’. The ‘war machine’, as Malene Busk has pointed out, ‘inhabits 
territory as pure deterritorialization’, and in doing so constitutes itself in 
fundamental contradiction to the realm of what Deleuze and Guattari call 
‘the majority’, that is to say dominant society.37 A ‘war machine’ is thus a 
‘minority’ that is differentiated from ‘the majority’ not in terms of its size, but 
in relation to the fact that it occupies space in a radically different manner. A 
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‘majority’ sediments a particular type of order, entrenches itself and occupies 
space in a universalising way, while a minority is a ‘line of flight’, unstable, 
ambiguous, and ‘ever-moving’.38 
This is a vision that arguably resonates rather well with the ambiguities 
of gangs as we have described them in Managua and Cape Town. Their 
violence is not directed against authority in any proactive sense of promising a 
(revolutionary) alternative, but nevertheless engages with authority, imposing 
often ephemeral and highly contradictory but fundamentally different forms 
of order to those projected by dominant society. As such, gangs could 
arguably be seen as providing glimpses of the fact that alternatives to the 
present are possible: they are constituted as ‘a point that would stand outside 
the temporality of the dominant order’ in a contemporary epoch that seems 
otherwise barren of plausible emancipatory revolutionary projects.39 
At the same time, however, as Deleuze and Guattari themselves are at 
great pains to point out, ‘the majority’ and ‘the minority’ should not be seen 
as distinct domains, as they are inseparable partners. The value of the concept 
of the ‘war machine’ is that it allows us to transcend easy and ultimately 
unproductive binary notions of ‘power’ and ‘resistance’, ‘oppressor’ and 
‘oppressed’, or ‘moral society’ versus ‘barbarians’, and focuses instead on the 
systemic articulations between different poles in society. The need for such 
a nuanced view is particularly clear when considering the way that gangs are 
increasingly policed around the world. Since the 1980s, states have arguably 
been waging something of a global ‘war on crime’, which has fundamentally 
shaped gangs and their actions worldwide. Originating in the US, but rapidly 
spreading to Europe and the global South, including in particular Central 
America and South Africa, this ‘war’ has notably involved the proliferation 
of new forms of policing, including in particular the seemingly contradictory 
approaches of ‘community policing’ and ‘zero tolerance’,40 which in actual 
fact can be seen as very similar forms of authority,41 insofar as elements 
of both approaches are drawn from – or resemble – counter-insurgency 
strategies.42
Although it might initially seem strange to compare extremely violent 
counter-insurgency practices with contemporary law-enforcement efforts 
against crime, the grammar of the two is remarkably similar. Community 
policing as well as counter-insurgency operations are often described as 
‘psycho-politico-security projects’ (to use the military lingo) that combine 
both development and security elements.43 Specific areas – ‘gang-affected 
areas’, for example – are to be ‘pacified’, through a combination of 
partnerships, development initiatives and ‘targeted’ security interventions. 
Similarly, both counter-insurgency and ‘zero tolerance’ policing operate on 
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the basis that authorities must strike hard against the first signs of ‘social 
decay’.44 Finally, both strategies are based on a binary opposition between 
‘law abiding citizens’ and ‘criminals’, and impose a stark either/or logic that 
allows for little of the ambiguity that is the hallmark of gangs – and indeed 
life more generally – in both Cape Town’s townships and Managua’s slums. 
In Central America, for example, the ‘Mano Dura’ – ‘hard hand’ – anti-gang 
strategy was introduced in 2003, allowing for the arrest of individuals from 
the age of 12 onwards, simply for having tattoos or dressing in particular 
ways;45 while in South Africa, multiple legal reforms and social development 
initiatives have systematically sought to categorise and identify ‘deserving’ 
and ‘undeserving’ populations, in order to attend to their ‘needs’ differently, 
so to speak.46
The deployment of such counter-insurgency strategies logically suggests 
the existence of insurgents, and begs the question of whether revolutionary 
potential is not being attributed to gangs. By fostering the production of 
predictable, visible frontlines and enemies, dominant society could be said to 
be extending an imagined subversive agency to gangs, which might perhaps 
be able to inspire revolution, very much along the lines that Fanon described 
in The Wretched of the Earth. Certainly, this is an idea that can be said to be 
implicit in James Holston’s recent analysis of the violent Primeiro Comando da 
Capital (PCC) gang in São Paulo, Brazil, as a form of ‘insurgent citizenship’.47 
Highlighting the paradoxical fact that the PCC formulates its demands on 
the Brazilian state on the basis of invocations of human rights and the rule 
of law, in a context where both of these are lacking, he contends that this 
makes these demands into an almost revolutionary statement. At the same 
time, he concludes that such a form of ‘insurgent citizenship’ ultimately 
delegitimises the already fragile Brazilian democracy, without offering much 
that is positive in its place. 
Deleuze and Guattari, however, warn us against associating either the 
‘minority’ or the ‘majority’ with good or evil.48 This suggests that what 
is really at stake with ‘war machines’ such as the PCC or the gangs of 
Managua and Cape Town is less the actual meanings of their behaviours 
and practices, and more the potential that their existence represents. In this 
respect, though, the articulation of gangs and policing practices resembles 
what Foucault discerned regarding the social production of ‘delinquency’ – 
a means of stifling youthful forms of resistance to oppression and injustice 
by constructing these as a concern of court rooms and prisons rather than 
of the streets.49 In other words, even if gangs can be seen as potentially 
offering a glimpse of the possibility of emancipatory social change, the tragic 
truth is that in the final analysis their existence in fact actively suppresses the 
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perception of such potential transformation, suggesting that the chance for 
utopia has come and gone in Nicaragua and South Africa – for now.
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